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Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Chief, Geographic Research

Problems of Cartographic and Geographic Intelligence Production

The following information is furnished for your use in seminar participation on the subject of "The Production Factor".

A. Cartographic Production Problems\*

1. By its nature, the Cartography Division is continually confronted with the problems of production. Essentially a service organization, it is not able to establish deadlines on its own initiative but must react to those established by the requesters with whom the Division deals. Requests for cartographic support carry varying priorities which result in a continually changing picture. The staff of D/GC meets every morning to readjust the priority of the current workload. One of the major problems of establishing effective priority across the board is the unsympathetic contrast between the rigid scheduling of the NIS Program, which represents over 30% of our work, and all other requests that carry current and often short deadlines.

2. When D/GC commits to a deadline, it is further complicated by the fact that the Division is estimating the ability of the reproduction facility to support our requirements. The reproduction units are plagued with the same changing priority problems and frequently are unable to support the Division within the requested time factor. The production problems associated with reproduction are partly aggravated by the physical separation of the two plants.

3. The following specific programs are largely involved in the production problems stated in paragraphs 1. and 2. above:

a. NIS. Rigid scheduling far in advance. Little or no give both in D/GC and reproduction. The Program generally requires an over-commitment in both Cartography and Reproduction.

b. NIE. High-level requirements usually with an urgent deadline. Subject to frequent changes late in the production plan. D/GC has adjusted to these requirements in an effective way.

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c. OSR, OSI. Support to a large number of projects. Interchange of projects as deadlines near frequently causes "upsets" in D/GC. Little can be done about this as it is inherent in general production problems.

d. DD/P. Difficulty of estimating requirements. Requests are often poorly coordinated within DD/P. Requirements that "flood" the Division and the reproduction plants, often without warning.

e. OCI. The Special Support Branch, D/GC, has been organized in such a way as to support OCI on a most current production basis. No problems exist but it does require a separate supporting unit.

g. State Department. Production problems are not significant other than infrequent "crash" requests from "high-level" State.

**B. Geographic Intelligence Production Problems\***

**1. Mechanical Programming**

Finished intelligence is normally worthless unless it is also disseminated. The readying of intelligence for dissemination -- the mechanical phase of production -- contains, however, some of our worst gremlins. A coordination must be achieved and maintained between analyst, branch chief, division chief, editor, cartography, reproduction, and other offices whose review may be necessary, and must be such that the project goes swiftly and smoothly without mangling anything in the process. The battle is never really won, and only constant vigilance assures tolerable levels of timeliness and accuracy.

**2. Communication Between Producers and Users**

Much of the research that we do, particularly in the geographic field, is "applied research" initiated in direct support of another office with a different mission. Our problem is to communicate effectively with its representative -- indeed, in some cases, to identify him.

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If we are not successful, the main thrust or key nuance of the requirement may be missed, with the result that the user, potentially, is in trouble. The problem is most prominent in our work for the clandestine and military services -- resulting from organizational separation, frequently-changing personnel, and need-to-know restrictions -- but is faced in all research specifically designed to support another unit's mission.

**3. Priorities**

a. Most geographic research we do is initiated not because the subject is interesting or has large informational gaps, but because someone needs it. That person is often the only one who can speak to the importance of the request. Yet his knowledge effectively encompasses only the mission of his own unit; someone still must speak to the comparative importance of the request in terms of other requests on hand. Here resides a large and constant problem, for in the case of geography we have [redacted]

[redacted] There is no true project priorities list, or examining board, or priorities coordinator. We have to play it by ear, using common sense and such specific justifications as our customers can give us, remembering at the same time that all requests which are accepted are thereby of acknowledged importance and cannot be sidetracked indefinitely by more glamorous projects.

b. Personnel resources do not permit equal research coverage of all important geographic areas and substantive topics. There is a compelling necessity, therefore, to survey continuously the following questions of priority:

Bloc areas vs. non-bloc areas?  
Basic research vs. current intelligence support?  
Operational support vs. "national intelligence"?  
Self-initiated work vs. "the clamorous customer"?  
Collection guides vs. finished intelligence production?

**4. Policy Guidance**

This is a problem which starts at the top echelon of management. The success or failure in the achievement of satisfactory policy guidance at subordinate echelons depends on the ability of intermediate officials to interpret and translate into meaningful action the guidance received from above. Policy guidance on mechanical, procedural questions is easy to communicate. Policy guidance on questions such as the priority and direction of emphasis in the substantive research effort is much more difficult to achieve. We must constantly attempt to improve communication of the latter type of guidance.

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**5. Substantive Coordination**

a. In one sense, coordination aims at avoiding unnecessary duplication of research effort. This requires elaborate mechanisms which, when they work properly, provide us with the tools for maintaining awareness of the related research work of other organizations and achieving a useful division of labor in the intelligence community's attack on broad intelligence problems. The Economic Intelligence Committee is an outstanding example of such a mechanism as it applies to a specific intelligence program. In addition, however, we have stimulated more broadly-based informal groups such as the Satellites Committee, Africa Roundtable, and Southeast Asia Discussion Group to serve as market places for the exchange of ideas, information, and proposals.

b. In another sense, the coordination problem consists in insuring that the substantive content of our intelligence represents an agreed or coordinated position. Many intelligence problems do not fall within the exclusive purview of a single research unit in our present organization. Consequently, there is a necessity of cross-checking and coordination among substantive units if the result is to represent an agreed (and, likely, most correct) position. Subordinate problems of office politics, questions of substantive prerogatives, and related matters sometimes hamper the achievement of this objective.

**6. Production**

The problem of differential security clearances and the resulting difficulty of utilizing certain competent research personnel on the production of truly all-source intelligence is worthy of attention. This problem -- the use of material from especially sensitive sources -- also affects the dissemination and use of the resulting product.

**7. Personnel and Direction**

Our personnel are, in general, highly intelligent, strongly motivated individuals. Their individualism, while undoubtedly desirable, also presents problems of supervision. The parochial viewpoints of economists, engineers, geographers, and other specialists sometimes show through and interfere with achievement of the most objective research product. Progress has been made in this problem area with the passage of time, but traces of the problem remain and it cannot be ignored.

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